The gradualist approach to trade liberalization views the uniform tari¤s implied by MFN status as an important step on the path to free trade. We investigate whether a regime of uniform tari¤s will be preferable to discriminatory tari¤s when countries engage in non-cooperative interaction in multilateral trade. The analysis includes product di¤erentiation and asymmetric costs. We show that with the cost asymmetry the countries will disagree on the choice of tari¤ regime. When the choice of import tari¤s and export subsidies is made sequentially the uniform tari¤ regime may not be sustainable, because of an incentive to deviate to a discriminatory regime. Hence, an international body is needed to ensure compliance with tari¤ agreement. JEL Classi…cation: F12, F13
Introduction
Imperfectly competitive markets cause a deviation from the e¢ cient outcome and provide a pretext for government intervention. In the trade literature it is now well understood that a country can gain through unilateral intervention in an imperfectly competitive market (see Brander 1995 , Brander and Spencer 1984 , 1985 . According to models of strategic trade policy with immobile but imperfectly competitive …rms, there is a welfare gain for a country from shifting rents to the …rms in its jurisdiction (by using a subsidy) or to the government (by using a tari¤). When several governments simultaneously intervene the outcome can be mutually damaging. One response suggested in the literature to eliminate the unwelcome distortions caused by such unilateral trade policies is the adoption of free trade since all countries would be better o¤ if none intervened. Reaching such a position could involve signi…cant (and costly) adjustment in many countries so a gradualist approach has much to commend it. An intermediate step on the gradualist path toward creating a free-trade environment is for supranational institutions like GATT/WTO to impose harmonized international rules.
An important example of a harmonized rule is the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause which is a signi…cant part of all multilateral trade agreements. It has been described by Horn and Mavroidis (2001) and Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) as one of the pillars of the WTO system. At the core of MFN is the idea of non-discrimination or symmetric treatment for all 1 . In other words, if country A grants country B the status of MFN, it simply agrees to treat country B no worse than any other country. Thus, it is natural to enquire into the circumstances in which a country prefers a regime of MFN tari¤s to one of tari¤ discrimination.
There have been several attempts in the literature to address this issue. Gatsios (1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991) investigated optimal discriminatory tari¤s imposed by an importing country on two foreign …rms located in two distinct exporting countries. They demonstrated that the importing country prefers to impose discriminatory or preferential tari¤s, rather than a uniform tari¤ across di¤erent countries, when the supplying …rms have di¤erent production costs. This occurs because the importing country has two instruments in the discriminatory tari¤ regime compared with just one instrument with the uniform tari¤ regime. A further result is that, with discriminatory tari¤s, the tari¤ on the low-cost …rm should be higher than that on the high-cost …rm since this reduces the total cost (marginal production cost plus speci…c tari¤) di¤eren-tial between imports from di¤erent countries. In terms of production e¢ ciency, production is diverted from the more e¢ cient to the less e¢ cient country under a discriminatory tari¤ regime. The consequences of enforcing a uniform tari¤ regime by imposing the MFN principle will be an overall gain in production e¢ ciency with distributional e¤ects favoring the cost-e¢ cient country.
It is important to ask whether these conclusions remain valid when the exporting governments also actively engage in trade policy. Liao and Wong (2006) allowed all three governments (the governments of the two exporting countries and that of the importing country) to choose optimal policies that maximize their welfare. For symmetric exporting countries producing perfect substitute goods and engaging in Cournot competition, they found that the importing country would choose a uniform tari¤ regime, whereas the exporting countries would prefer a discriminatory tari¤ regime. In a similar setting, Saggi and Yildiz (2005) consider the e¤ect of di¤erent cost and market structure, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition between the producers in the exporting countries, allowing for product di¤erentiation. In Saggi (2004 Saggi ( , 2006 and Saggi and Yildiz (2009) the e¤ect of entering an MFN agreement and the endogenous formation of MFN clubs is considered in a model with Cournot competition and segmented markets for a homogenous good when producers di¤er in cost of production, and all countries produce, import, and export. The main …nding, assuming linear demand, is that the high-cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN adoption, while the MFN adoption by the country with average cost production is the most desirable. These are interesting results, but the assumptions of homogenous products leaves open the question of whether they are robust to the introduction of product di¤erentiation.
The contribution of this paper to the literature on optimal trade policy is to extend existing analysis by introducing product di¤erentiation in a multilateral trade setting in which every country produces, trades, and employs active trade policy. We also move away from homogenous products and permit product di¤erentiation. We have explored both Cournot and Bertrand competition (though we only report results for Cournot in this paper). Using this generalized model we analyze the welfare consequences of two di¤erent tari¤ regimes: a uniform tari¤ regime, as required by the MFN clause of GATT/WTO, and a discriminatory tari¤ regime. We employ the model to address whether countries still pay an export subsidy to their …rms (as proposed by Brander and Spencer (1985) , and others) when it is known that the importing party will respond, and whether countries achieve a mutually bene…cial outcome by agreeing to constrain their choices through MFN. Our results show that with simultaneous choice of tari¤s and export subsidies or with tari¤s chosen …rst, the low-cost country always prefers the uniform regime and the high-cost the discriminatory regime. The preference of a country with intermediate cost level depends on whether it is close to the low cost or the high cost. When the countries di¤er in cost disagreement on the preferred regime will always arise. The outcome when export subsidies are chosen before tari¤s is di¤erent: all three countries prefer the uniform regime (unless there is considerable cost divergence between the two higher-cost countries). At …rst sight this seems to imply that MFN will be implemented under this timing structure. However, after the tari¤ regime has been announced and the subsidies chosen there is an incentive for each country to renege on the MFN agreement and impose discriminatory tari¤s. This …nding implies that an international body can play a role in ensuring tari¤ agreements are respected and provides motivation for the trading partners to make an international commitment to follow an announced tari¤ regime (such as to follow the MFN clause of GATT/WTO) which cannot be easily changed.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the model used in the paper. In section 3 we derive the equilibrium for the discriminatory tari¤ regime and the uniform tari¤ regime when tari¤s and subsidies are chosen simultaneously, and provide a welfare comparison of the two tari¤ regimes. This is undertaken …rst for symmetric and then for asymmetric production costs. In section 4 a similar analysis is provided for the situations when tari¤s and subsidies are chosen sequentially. In section 5 we analyze the credibility of agreement upon tari¤ regime when the choice of export subsidies is observed before the tari¤s are set. The main …ndings are summarized in section 6. Details of analytical derivations are gathered in the Appendix available online at http://people.exeter.ac.uk/gdmyles/papers/pdfs/MfnStaApp.pdf.
Structure of Model
The structure of the model is the following: The world economy consists of three countries that produce and trade di¤erentiated products. We refer to country 1 as the home country, and countries 2 and 3 as foreign countries. Each country is host to a single …rm, and the home country is distinguished by hosting the …rm with the lowest production cost. The three governments understand the structure of the oligopolistic industry and set credible tari¤s on imports and taxes or subsidies on exports. The countries determine their policies strategically. Firms can transport their product costlessly, but the markets are assumed to be segmented for consumers.
The governments choose their policy variables (an export subsidy and an import tari¤) to maximize the welfare of their countries. We analyze the interactions among the governments as a non-cooperative multi-stage game. In the …rst stage, the countries announce whether they are using a uniform tari¤ regime (U ) or a discriminatory tari¤ regime (D). Three di¤erent timing structures are considered for the later stages of the game. In game S, export subsidies and import tari¤s are chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In game I, import tari¤s are chosen …rst, and export subsidies are chosen after observing the tari¤s. In game E, the timing is reversed. The di¤erent sequences of moves can be viewed as the di¤erence in timing, or in information structure, between setting internal (subsidy to the domestic …rm) and external (tari¤s on goods produced abroad) policies. In the …nal stage of the game, the …rms move simultaneously with each …rm taking the tari¤s and subsidies, as well as the decision of the other …rms, as given. All technology and demand information is known to all parties. We derive the equilibrium of the game for the two tari¤ regimes. The regimes are then compared in terms of the welfare of each country, as well as global welfare de…ned as the sum of the welfare of all three countries.
The demand side of the model is derived from the utility maximization problem of a representative consumer in each country. We follow the modelling assumptions and notation of Yi (1996) . Denote country i's consumption of the good produced in country j by q ij . The utility function of the consumer in country i is then given by
where Z i is consumption of a competitive numeraire good that can be costlessly transported across countries. The sub-utility function is
where parameter 2 [0; 1] captures the extent of product di¤erentiation (see Tirole, 1988) . When = 1 the products are perfect substitutes. As decreases the products become less homogenous, and at = 0 the demands for the goods are independent. From the utility function the inverse demand functions are
where p ij is the price received in country i for country j's good. Firm i has constant marginal cost, c i ; since we do not deal with the entry of …rms, …xed costs are set to zero for simplicity. The level of pro…t, i , for the …rm located in country i is
where s ij is the export subsidy imposed by country i for the good exported to country j, and t ji is the import tari¤ imposed by the country j on goods imported from country i. Throughout the paper we consider only the case of speci…c subsidies and tari¤s.
2 The …rms can compete by choosing quantities (Cournot) or prices (Bertrand) in each country. We focus upon Cournot competition; the results obtained for Bertrand competition are qualitatively the same and the details are available from the authors upon request. For analytical tractability we consider identical demands (a i = 1 for i = 1; 2; 3); it is not di¢ cult to extend the model to the analysis of markets of di¤erent sizes (say, a 1 a 2 a 3 ). To analyze the e¤ect of the cost asymmetry, without loss of generality, we normalize c 1 to zero and assume that c 2 0 and c 3 0.
For some combinations of costs and degree of product di¤erentiation the …rms may be driven to corner solutions where their exports to one or more countries are zero. The analysis of later sections restricts attention to permissible cost combinations that ensure all quantities are non-negative in equilibrium. In fact, we choose to focus throughout on interior equilibria in which all quantities traded between countries are strictly positive. We denote the permissible set of non-negative costs that ensure all quantities are positive for a given value of by C ( ).
Country i chooses its import tari¤ and export subsidy to maximize the sum of domestic consumer surplus, domestic pro…t, and revenue
Under the discriminatory tari¤ regime country i can (potentially) impose different tari¤s on the imports from its trading partners. Under the uniform tari¤ regime the tari¤s must be the same, so t i = t ij for all j 6 = i.
Simultaneous Choice
In this section we consider game S in which the countries choose their tari¤s and subsidies simultaneously. We determine the equilibrium of the game for the two tari¤ regimes. The welfare levels of the countries in the regimes are then compared to deduce preferences over regimes.
Discriminatory tari¤ regime
Solving the game with discriminatory tari¤s shows that the equilibrium subsidy on exports from country i to county j is given by
( 1) where the superscripts D and S denote the discriminatory regime in game S: Coe¢ cients A DS n ( ) are rational functions of : These functions, and all those that follow, are detailed in the online Appendix. The level of subsidy can also be written as
where q
DS ji
is the quantity exported from j to i. Since 0 1 and we work only with costs in the permissible region where q DS ji > 0, it follows that s DS ij < 0: The negative value of the subsidy means that all three countries tax their exports. The equilibrium tari¤ set by country i on imports from county j is t
The sign of the tari¤ depends on the con…guration of costs and the product di¤erentiation parameter and it is possible that the countries …nd it optimal to subsidize imports. To understand these expressions it is helpful to begin by considering the di¤erence between the export subsidies and the import tari¤s that country i applies on trade with countries j and k. These di¤erences are given by
where
Thus, when the demands for the differentiated products are independent ( = 0) the subsidies on exported goods are equal for any cost di¤erential. Otherwise, exports to the lower-cost foreign country are taxed less heavily than exports to the higher-cost country. In choosing a value for the export subsidy a country has to trade the enhancement of competitiveness (implying a subsidy) against the gain from securing part of the foreign tax base (implying a tax). The …nding that export taxes are always imposed shows that the second e¤ect dominates in this model, but the lower tax on exports to the lower-cost country re ‡ects the need for competitiveness. The tari¤ imposed on imports from the lower-cost country are higher (or, the subsidies are lower, when imports are subsidized) than that on imports from the high-cost country. As a consequence, the discriminatory tari¤ policy has the e¤ect of partly equalizing the cost di¤erences between the exporting countries and extracting relatively more of the surplus of the low-cost exporter. It is this feature of the discriminatory tari¤s that explains why we …nd below that the home country (which always has the lowest cost) ultimately prefers the uniform tari¤ regime.
To explore the structure of tari¤s further we separate the analysis into three cases: the policy of the home country, the policy of the foreign countries toward the home country, and the policy between the two foreign countries. Consider …rst the symmetric case with c 2 = c 3 = c: With symmetry (2) shows that the tari¤ set by the home country on imports from country i is
( ) < 0, so that at c = 0 the tari¤s can only be positive when
If c = 0 the tari¤ is positive if < S and negative if > S . This pattern for the tari¤ is also found in the other games so it is worth developing the intuition. The choice of tari¤ always trades the incentive to subsidize and, hence, reduce monopoly deadweight loss by increasing output against the incentive to tax in order to secure part of the surplus obtained from the exploitation of monopoly power. When the demands are independent (low ) the …rms have greater monopoly power which they employ to secure pro…t. The positive tari¤ then has two e¤ects: it gives a country's …rm an advantage and allows it to secure relatively more surplus that remains within the country, and it extracts some of the surplus obtained by the importing …rms. When the goods are closer substitutes ( high) there is less surplus to extract so it makes more sense to use a negative tari¤ that encourages competition and allows the country to increase welfare by reducing deadweight loss. By continuity, the same conclusions hold for c su¢ ciently close to zero in the symmetric case, and for c i ; c j su¢ ciently close to zero with a cost asymmetry. Fig. 1 illustrates how the sign of optimal tari¤s imposed by the home country on imports from the two foreign countries depends on the con…guration of production costs. The set of permissible costs is the area bounded by the two black lines. As increases the red line (t DS 12 = 0) and the blue line (t DS 13 = 0) move toward the origin, so the set of cost parameters, (c i ; c j ) ; for which at least one tari¤ is positive shrinks. The …gure also shows that with symmetric costs for the foreign countries the sign of the optimal tari¤s changes from positive to negative (for < S ) once the production cost exceeds the threshold, c DS , found from (3)
The intuition is that the low-cost country has a worldwide comparative advantage. It …nds it bene…cial to use some of the surplus generated by this advantage to …nance a subsidy that encourages supply to its market and therefore reduce deadweight loss. Clearly, c 0 for S , and, hence, the optimal tari¤s in the symmetric case are negative when the goods are close substitutes.
[INSERT FIG. 1 HERE]
Now consider the tari¤s imposed by the foreign countries on imports from the home country. In the symmetric case,
By continuity, the same holds for c su¢ ciently close to zero in the symmetric case, and for both c 2 and c 3 su¢ ciently close to zero with cost asymmetry. When the production costs are close to each other the countries subsidize imports if the goods are close substitutes and tax imports otherwise. These observations are illustrated in Fig. 2 for = 1.
[INSERT FIG. 2 HERE]
Finally, we analyze the interaction between the two foreign countries. With symmetric production costs the expression for tari¤s simpli…es to [ INSERT FIGS. 3 AND 4 HERE] This analysis of (2) is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the discriminatory regime in game S there exists S such that: 1. The signs of tari¤ s on imports into the home country are determined according to: (i) if > S then both tari¤ s are negative; (ii) if S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j
2. The signs of tari¤ s on imports from the home country are determined according to: (i) if < S then both tari¤ s are positive; (ii) if S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j
3. The sign of tari¤ s on imports between the two foreign countries are determined according to:
(ii) the converse is true if S :
To summarize, all countries tax their exports. If product di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently strong, the import tari¤s between all pairs of countries are positive when the countries do not di¤er very much in production costs. When production costs are su¢ ciently lower in one country compared to the other two, then the low-cost country subsidizes imports from the high-cost countries, while the two high-cost countries tax the imports from the low-cost country and from each other. When the products are close substitutes imports are subsidized by the lower-cost countries and taxed by the higher-cost countries.
Uniform tari¤ regime
We now analyze the optimal choice of policy under the uniform tari¤ regime that represents an MFN agreement. Speci…cally, the home country levies the same tari¤ on imports from both foreign countries; however, there is no such restriction on export subsidies. The same applies to the foreign countries.
By solving the game we derive the following expression for subsidies
and for tari¤s
The sign of the subsidy is clearly negative, so all three countries tax their exports. The di¤erence between the levels of export taxes applied to countries j and k in the uniform tari¤ regime is given by
where C S 0 ( ) > 0. Hence, the exports into a lower-cost country are taxed more heavily than the exports into a higher-cost country. This is opposite to the situation in the discriminatory tari¤ regime. The intuition for this is that the uniform regime forces the tari¤ on imports from the lower-cost country to be reduced relative to the tari¤ on the higher-cost country. This reduces the surplus extracted from the lower-cost country. To o¤set this e¤ect the export tax on goods going to the lower-cost country is raised. The opposite argument applies to the higher-cost country.
We again separate discussion of the tari¤s into an analysis of the policy of the home country and then an analysis of the policies of the foreign countries. From (5) the sign of the uniform tari¤ for the home country depends on the con…guration of costs and the degree of product di¤erentiation. In the symmetric case (c i = c j = c) t
, and B U S 2 ( ) < 0. Therefore, the home country's import tari¤ is negative when the products are close substitutes ( S ). Otherwise, under weaker substitutability ( S ) the tari¤ is positive for c su¢ ciently small and changes sign to negative when c exceeds the threshold
( ) The e¤ect of cost asymmetry is illustrated in Fig. 5 for = 0 :5. The …gure shows that the sign of the uniform tari¤ is the same as those of the discriminatory tari¤ when both foreign countries have low costs or high costs. When one foreign country is high cost and the other low cost the uniform tari¤ averages the discriminatory tari¤s.
[ INSERT FIG. 5 HERE] Now consider the optimal tari¤s imposed by a foreign country. In the symmetric case, country i's optimal tari¤ is given by
The coe¢ cient on c in (6) is negative (positive) when is below (above) e S , where e S is de…ned by B 
, and, since e c U S ( ) 2 is outside the permissible set, the tari¤ is positive. For e S < < S the tari¤ is also positive for all c. Finally, for S < < 1 the tari¤ is negative at c = 0 and changes sign from negative to positive when cost exceeds the threshold e c U S ( ). Hence, when the products substantially di¤er the tari¤ is positive for 5 The value of e S ' 0:34; so e S < S :
any value of c. When the products are close substitutes the tari¤ is positive for higher costs and negative for lower costs.
In the general case with a cost asymmetry the results are obtained directly from the analysis of (5). As shown in the online Appendix, as long as is su¢ ciently small (0 < b S ) the locus of points (c i ; c j ) : t
U S i
(c i ; c j ; ) = 0 is outside C U S ( ) and the tari¤ is positive for all (c i ; c j ) 2 C U S ( ). The value of b S is determined by solving t Proposition 2 In the uniform regime in game S there exist
such that: 1. The sign of tari¤ on imports into the home country is determined according to: (i) if > S then the tari¤ is negative; (ii)if S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j
2. The sign of tari¤ s on imports into the foreign countries is determined according to: (i) if < b S then the tari¤ s set by both foreign countries are positive;
(ii) if b S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j
[INSERT FIGS. 6-8 HERE]
Welfare comparison
The welfare levels of the three countries under the two tari¤ regimes are now compared. The intention is to relate the preferences of the countries over the alternative regimes to the level of cost. As a …rst step consider the di¤erence between the optimal policies in the two regimes. For the optimal subsidies we have and for the optimal tari¤s
where C S 1 ( ) > 0 and C S 2 ( ) > 0. The di¤erence between the subsidies in the two regimes depends upon the position of the country in the cost ranking. In the case of the home country (which has the lowest cost) the export tax is higher under the uniform regime than the discriminatory regime. This is because the export tax is being used in the uniform regime to compensate for the inability to discriminate in the level of tari¤. For all three countries the tari¤ in the uniform regime is averaging the tari¤s used in the discriminatory regime, and the sign of the di¤erences follows accordingly.
With identical production costs in the foreign countries (c 2 = c 3 = c) the di¤erence between the home country's welfare levels in the two regimes is given by W U S 1
where Z S 1 ( ) > 0 and Z S 2 ( ) > 0. Hence, the home country strictly prefers the uniform tari¤ regime if foreign marginal cost c > 0. If the production cost in the two other countries is zero then import tari¤s and export subsidies are identical in the two regimes, as is the welfare level of the home country. For the foreign countries the di¤erences in the welfare levels are given by
The expression on the right-hand side is negative, which implies that the foreign countries strictly prefer the discriminatory tari¤ regime whenever production cost is strictly positive. With cost asymmetry the lowest-cost country again prefers the uniform regime. The preference of the higher-cost countries depend on how much their production costs di¤er. 7 Intuitively, a continuity argument implies that if the production costs in the foreign countries are relatively high and close to each other, then both prefer the discriminatory regime. If the costs di¤er substantially the country with lower cost will be better o¤ under the uniform regime. This is illustrated in Fig. 9 for = 0:5.
[INSERT FIG. 9 HERE]
The explanation for these preferences is found in the fact that in the discriminatory regime the equilibrium tari¤s partially equalize the di¤erences in production cost. This process is always to the disadvantage of the low-cost country. The equalization cannot occur in the uniform regime, so the lowcost country naturally prefers the MFN regime. In contrast, for precisely the converse reasons, the higher-cost countries are united in preferring the discriminatory regime when their costs are not too dissimilar. When their costs are dissimilar the discriminatory tari¤s will work against the lower-cost of the two countries, so it is this country that will switch preference to the uniform regime.
Global welfare, de…ned as the sum of the welfare levels of the three countries, is higher under the uniform tari¤ regime for all permissible costs and any degree of product di¤erentiation. The increase in global welfare is explained by the fact that discriminatory tari¤s shift production to high-cost countries so enhance production ine¢ ciency. Moving to uniform tari¤s eliminates this e¤ect.
Proposition 3 With simultaneous choice of import tari¤ s and export subsidies:
(1) The country with the lowest production cost always prefers the uniform tari¤ regime.
(2) When the production costs in the higher-cost countries are identical both prefer the discriminatory tari¤ regime. (3) When the production costs di¤ er substantially, only the highest-cost country prefers the discriminatory regime. (4) Global welfare is always higher under the uniform regime.
Sequential Choice
In the previous section we analyzed the simultaneous choice of import tari¤s and export subsidies. It is important to consider alternative timing structures to ensure the robustness of the results. We now analyze games I and E in which the choice of tari¤s and subsidies is made sequentially.
Tari¤s set before subsidies
In game I the countries …rst set import tari¤s. Having observed the chosen import tari¤s, the countries then choose their export subsidies. As we shall see, this timing structure delivers results that are only slightly di¤erent from those obtained in the setting with simultaneous choice.
Solving the game from the …nal stage, the export subsidies in the discriminatory tari¤ regime are given by
Thus, in the permissible set with positive quantities the export subsidies are always negative. The equilibrium tari¤ levied by country i on imports from country j is
The di¤erences in the subsidies and tari¤s between pairs of countries are
where C DI 1 ( ) > 0 and C DI 2 ( ) > 0. The qualitative properties of these difference are the same as in game S: when the demands for the di¤erentiated products are independent the subsidies (or, indeed, taxes) on exported goods are equal, for any cost di¤erential. Otherwise, exports to a lower-cost foreign country are taxed less heavily than exports to the higher-cost country and the tari¤ imposed on imports from a lower-cost country is higher.
As before, we consider the choices of the home country and the foreign countries separately. In the symmetric case the expression for the tari¤ levied by the home country on exports to the foreign countries can be written as
Since B DI 0 ( ) > 0 and B DI 2 ( ) < 0, the sign of the tari¤ will change as c increases:
For all values of the pairs c DI ; c DI are in the permissible set, so in the symmetric case the home country's tari¤ always changes sign from positive to negative as c increases. The tari¤ on imports from the home country in the case of symmetric costs is given by
All terms on the right-hand side are positive, which ensures the tari¤ is always positive. The expression for the tari¤s on imports between the foreign countries can be re-written as
and, therefore, in the symmetric case the import tari¤s between the foreign countries are also positive. The general case, with asymmetric costs, is described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4
In the discriminatory regime in game I: 1. The sign of tari¤ s levied by the home country on imports from foreign country i is determined according to
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j. 2. The tari¤ s levied by the foreign countries on imports from the home country are positive. 3. The sign of the tari¤ s levied by foreign country i on imports from foreign country j is determined according to
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j. In particular, both tari¤ s are positive when the production costs are equal.
In the uniform tari¤ regime in game I the equilibrium export subsidy is
and the expression for the uniform tari¤ chosen by country i is
The analysis of the tari¤s is given in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the uniform regime in game I: 1. The sign of the tari¤ levied by the home country on imports from the foreign countries is determined according to
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j: 2. The tari¤ s levied by both foreign countries are positive.
The di¤erences in import tari¤s and export subsidies between the discriminatory and the uniform tari¤ regimes are given by
These results have similar qualitative properties to those for the game S so the tari¤ on imports into a higher cost country is larger under the uniform regime. The welfare comparison between the di¤erent regimes is the same as with the simultaneous choice, described in Proposition 3. Hence:
Proposition 6 The preferences of the countries over tari¤ regimes in game I are the same as in game S, as described in Proposition 3.
Subsidies set before tari¤s
We now analyze the equilibrium in game E: In the …rst stage the tari¤ regime is announced. In the second stage each country chooses its export subsidy. The countries move simultaneously, each taking the export subsidy of its competitor as given but being aware of how the choice of subsidy will subsequently a¤ect the tari¤s. In the …nal stage, the countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose the tari¤s, taking the export subsidies as given.
Solving the game shows that the equilibrium export subsidies in the discriminatory tari¤ regime are
The subsidies are always negative. The equilibrium tari¤s are given by
( ) < 0, and
0.
In the symmetric case, with c 2 = c 3 = c, the tari¤s imposed by the home country become
( ) < 0, the outcome is determined by the sign of B DE 0 ( ), which is positive for 0 < E and negative for E < 1. 8 Hence, when is above E the tari¤ is negative. When is below E , the home country's tari¤ is positive at c = 0, and by continuity remains positive as c increases up to a threshold, c DE , de…ned by
The tari¤ is negative for c > c DE . For the tari¤s imposed by the foreign countries on imports from the home country we have
The coe¢ cient on c is positive, and therefore the tari¤ is positive for 0 < E . For E < 1 the tari¤ is negative for c below a threshold, e c DE , de…ned by
and is positive for c above this value. The tari¤s on imports between foreign countries in the symmetric case can be written as
The expression in the numerator is negative (positive) when is above (below) E . Therefore, with cost symmetry the tari¤s on imports between the two foreign countries are positive for 0 < E and negative for E < 1. These properties are qualitatively identical to those established for game S and are summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 In the discriminatory regime in game E there exists E such that: 1. The sign of the tari¤ levied by the home country on imports from foreign country i is determined according to: (i) if > E then both tari¤ s are negative; (ii) if E then for i; j 2 f2; 3g
2. The sign of the tari¤ levied by foreign country i on imports from the home country is determined according to: (i) if < E then both tari¤ s are positive; (ii) if E then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j
3. The sign of the tari¤ levied by foreign country i on imports from foreign country j is determined according to
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j.
In the uniform tari¤ regime the equilibrium subsidy set by country i on exports to country j is
The equilibrium export subsidies are always negative. The di¤erence between the two subsidies to countries j and k is
where C E 0 ( ) > 0. As in the previous games, in the uniform tari¤ regime the exports to a lower-cost country are taxed less than those to a higher-cost country. The equilibrium value of the uniform tari¤ set by country i is 2. The tari¤ levied by both foreign countries is determined according to: (i) if < E then the tari¤ s set by both foreign countries are positive; (ii)if E then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6 = j
The di¤erence between the export subsidies and import tari¤s under two regimes is given by
The di¤erence between this case and the previous two cases (games S and I) is that the di¤erences in the export subsidies and import tari¤s between the regimes depend on the production costs in all three countries. They can therefore be positive or negative for di¤erent combinations of parameters. Further analysis reveals the following. (1) The export tax imposed by the home country is higher under the uniform regime for any cost di¤erential between the foreign countries, whereas the import tari¤ is higher under the uniform regime when the two foreign countries have identical costs. When costs are su¢ ciently di¤erent the tari¤ on imports in the lower-cost foreign country is lower under the uniform regime; the converse is for the higher-cost foreign country. (2) In the symmetric case, the tari¤ on imports from the home country into a foreign country are higher under the uniform regime when the cost is low, and lower when the cost is su¢ ciently high; the same is true for export taxes. With cost asymmetry in the foreign countries, the tari¤ on import from a home country into a foreign country is higher under the uniform regime when the production cost in the other foreign country is low, and is higher under the discriminatory regime when the production cost in the other foreign country is su¢ ciently high. The same is true for export taxes. (3) The export taxes and import tari¤s on trade between the two foreign countries are always higher under the uniform regime than the discriminatory regime.
The di¤erence in outcome between this game and games S and I is a direct consequence of the timing structure. The key feature of game E is that the subsidies can be used strategically to a¤ect the tari¤s that are chosen in the next stage. The strategic e¤ect of the subsidies is important in both the discriminatory and the uniform regimes. In the discriminatory regime the tari¤s partially equalize costs, so reduce the competitive advantage of the low-cost country. The countervailing e¤ect of the subsidy is then especially important for the low-cost country. Equally, in the uniform regime the countries lose one degree of freedom in their policy choice so the subsidies are used to compensate for this loss.
The welfare levels of the three countries under the two tari¤ regimes are now compared. This is …rst undertaken for the case of symmetric production costs in the foreign countries and then for the case of asymmetric costs. The di¤erence in the welfare levels of the home country under the two regimes when c i = c j = c is given by a quadratic polynomial in c
The coe¢ cients satisfy A 1 ( ) > 0, A 2 ( ) < 0, A 3 ( ) > 0, and A 2 ( ) 2 4A 1 ( ) A 3 ( ) < 0. Therefore, this expression is strictly positive, which implies that the home country always prefers the uniform tari¤ regime when the production costs in the foreign countries are identical. For the foreign countries
This expression is strictly positive for small values of c; and switches sign from positive to negative when c exceeds a threshold value. This is di¤erent from the welfare outcome in games S and I: now in the symmetric case all three countries prefer the uniform regime in a substantial subset of the permissible set of costs for any degree of product di¤erentiation. The foreign countries prefer the discriminatory regime only when costs are su¢ ciently high.
With cost asymmetry the home country's welfare is again higher under the uniform regime than the discriminatory regime. The preferences of the foreign countries di¤er when the cost di¤erential between them is su¢ ciently large. These observations are illustrated in Fig. 10 which shows how the preferences of the three countries depend on the con…guration of costs when the demands for goods are independent, i.e. for = 0. For larger values of the picture is very similar, but the area of disagreement on the uniform regime is smaller. [INSERT FIG. 10 HERE] 5 Credibility of the announced policy
We have shown that when the import tari¤s and export subsidies are chosen simultaneously, or the import tari¤s are chosen before export subsidies, the country with the lowest production cost is always better o¤ under the uniform tari¤ regime while the countries with relatively high production costs are better o¤ under the discriminatory regime. The disagreement about the choice of regime arises for a substantial set of parameter values. The situation when import tari¤s are chosen after export subsidies is di¤erent: all three countries prefer the uniform regime, unless one (or both) foreign countries has a very high production cost.
It might seem that these observations suggest there are stronger grounds for expecting the implementation of an MFN agreement when tari¤s are chosen after subsidies. However, there is an additional issue that has to be addressed before this claim can be asserted. The ordering of moves raises the possibility that after the tari¤ regime (uniform or discriminatory) is announced and the export subsidies have been chosen and observed, the countries may reconsider their choice of tari¤s and deviate from the announced regime. The countries will renege on the agreement to a tari¤ regime if this is bene…cial. This possibility does not arise when tari¤s and subsidies are chosen simultaneously, or when tari¤s are chosen …rst.
We now show that, indeed, having announced the uniform tari¤ regime each country has an incentive to deviate to the discriminatory regime after the export subsidies are chosen, unless the production costs in two other countries are identical (in which case the tari¤s chosen under the two regimes coincide). The central result concerning the credibility of the announcement of a uniform regime are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 9 When export subsidies are chosen …rst then the agreement on the uniform regime is not sustainable: (i) Each country has an individual incentive to deviate to the discriminatory regime.
(ii) A deviation by one country bene…ts the higher-cost non-deviating country.
(iii) The welfare of the low-cost non-deviating country and global welfare fall as a result of such deviation.
It is not surprising that there is an incentive to deviate. Under the discriminatory regime a country has two import policy instruments, whereas under the uniform regime it has only one. An alternative way of viewing this is that the uniform regime is the discriminatory with an additional constraint on the choice of tari¤s. If other countries choose the uniform regime then the additional ‡exibility of the discriminatory regime is always going to prove appealing.
Conclusions
We have addressed the question of whether trading partners can achieve a mutually bene…cial outcome by following the MFN principle which involves an importing country applying the same tari¤ to all imports from all exporting countries. This principle is part of all multilateral trading agreements. The MFN principle is seen as reducing distortions in trading patterns and providing an important step on the path to liberalized trade. Moreover, it is usually seen as being in the interest of a developing country to secure MFN status from a developed country. The central component of our analysis is to embed MFN within a model of strategic trade policy to investigate how it interacts with other trade policies.
We have modelled trade policy in a discriminatory regime, in which tari¤s can vary on imports from di¤erent countries, and in a uniform regime where MFN applies and a single tari¤ is levied on all imports. We have also considered three timing structures for the trade policy game. For each game we have determined the optimal trade policy in the two regimes when countries act strategically in choosing their policy instruments and used this to construct preferences over tari¤ regimes. In every situation there has always been a lowcost country and two others that may higher costs. The equilibrium outcomes have been related to the degree of substitutability between products and to the cost asymmetries between countries.
Our results show that discriminatory tari¤s have the e¤ect of partially equalizing for cost di¤erentials, so the low-cost country always faces the highest tari¤s. The countries also use export taxes to secure part of their trading partners'tax bases. The chosen tari¤s in the uniform regime are an average of the tari¤s in the discriminatory regime. With simultaneous choice (game S) and tari¤s chosen …rst (games I) the low-cost country always prefers the uniform regime and the high-cost the discriminatory regime. The preference of the country with intermediate cost level depends on whether it is closest to the low cost or the high cost. If the countries di¤er in cost then there is disagreement on the preferred regime. What is surprising about these results is that it is the low-cost country that prefers the uniform regime. The implication of this …nding depends on how the cost structure of the model is interpreted. In many discussions of MFN it is seen as a bene…t that developing countries wish to obtain from developed countries. If one interprets our model as one in which the developed country has a better technology, and so lower cost, then our results show that it is the developed that actually gains from the operation of MFN. In this case MFN may not imply the allocation of bene…ts that are often presumed. Alternatively, one could interpret the developing countries to have lower cost (perhaps through lower real wages). In this case, the gains of MFN do accrue to the developing countries so that they should pursue MFN status. In contrast, the developed countries would seek to maintain a discriminatory tari¤ regime.
The outcome with subsidies chosen before tari¤s (game E) is di¤erent In this case all three countries prefer the uniform regime (unless there is considerable cost divergence between the two higher-cost countries). At …rst sight this might be taken as suggesting that there is a good chance MFN will be implemented if this timing structure is correct. However, after the tari¤ regime has been announced and the subsidies chosen there is an incentive for all countries to deviate and impose discriminatory tari¤s. Hence, the MFN principle is not sustainable unless it is enforced by an outside body. This gives motivation for the existence of international agencies with the role of monitoring and enforcing tari¤ agreements.
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